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    Briefing Note · Theory of the Firm

    From Coase to the Agent

    Why the Economics of the Firm Are About to Be Rewritten

    A reading of ninety years of organizational economics — from Ronald Coase to Oliver Williamson to the agent-mediated firm now forming — and what the unit economics of autonomous knowledge work mean for the institutions that absorb them.

    By Angel Armendariz  ·  May 2026
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    90
    years since Coase isolated the variable that built the modern firm
    6%
    of organizations attribute >5% of EBIT to AI (McKinsey, 2025)
    $830B
    enterprise software repricing event, February 3–10, 2026
    Section I·Coase's Variable Moves
    Ronald Coase published nine pages in 1937 that explain why your company exists. They now explain why everything you understand about running it is about to change.

    Coase asked a question economists had ignored for sixty years: if markets allocate resources so efficiently, why do firms exist at all? Why not contract every job, every decision, every coordination problem on the open market? His answer became foundational economics. Markets carry hidden costs — finding the right counterparty, negotiating the terms, monitoring whether the work got done, suing when it did not. The firm absorbs these costs by replacing market transactions with managerial authority. Inside the firm, you tell people what to do and pay them a salary. The firm exists as the institutional workaround for the friction of human exchange.1

    Oliver Williamson sharpened the argument across the four decades that followed. Three forces, he showed, determine where firm boundaries fall: bounded rationality (you cannot foresee every contingency), opportunism (counterparties may cheat), and asset specificity (some investments lose their value outside the relationship that produced them). The Nobel committee recognized Coase in 1991 and Williamson in 2009. Their combined work explains, with more durability than any rival theory, why companies grow, why they shrink, why they integrate vertically, and why they spin work back out to vendors.2 One variable runs underneath all of it: the cost of getting humans to coordinate.

    That cost is collapsing. AI agents — software that perceives, reasons, decides, and acts on behalf of a principal — perform the cognitive work of coordination at the marginal cost of compute. A November 2025 NBER paper from Shahidi, Rusak, Manning, Fradkin, and Horton calls the resulting condition the Coasean Singularity: a state where the activities that once made coordination expensive — eliciting preferences, negotiating terms, monitoring compliance, verifying identity — drop toward zero variable cost.3 Coase’s variable, the one underneath everything, has begun to move for the first time in ninety years.

    Every prior wave of enterprise technology — ERP, the internet, cloud, SaaS — reduced specific kinds of coordination cost. None of them touched the cost of cognition itself. Agents do.

    When the input variable that built the modern firm shifts by an order of magnitude, the firm reconstitutes around the new economics. Companies that read this clearly will redesign their org charts, their workflows, and their unit economics around what coordination now costs them. Companies that read it as automation will drop agents inside organizational structures built for the old economics, capture a small fraction of the available value, and watch their margins compress as the redesigners overtake them. The choice plays out over the next thirty-six months.

    Sources
    1.Coase, R.H. (1937). “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica, 4(16), 386–405. The foundational essay; awarded part of the basis for Coase’s 1991 Nobel Prize in Economics.
    2.Williamson, O.E. (1979). “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.” Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233–261. Williamson received the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics for this body of work.
    3.Shahidi, P., Rusak, G., Manning, B.S., Fradkin, A., & Horton, J.J. (2025). “The Coasean Singularity? Demand, Supply, and Market Design with AI Agents.” NBER Working Paper No. 34468, November 2025.
    4.Brynjolfsson, E., Li, D., & Raymond, L. (2025). “Generative AI at Work.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 140(2), 889–942. Published February 2025.
    5.Polanyi, M. (1966). The Tacit Dimension. University of Chicago Press. The classic articulation of the proposition that “we know more than we can tell.”
    6.Klarna Press Release, “Klarna AI assistant handles two-thirds of customer service chats in its first month,” February 27, 2024.
    7.Siemiatkowski, S., as reported in Bloomberg (“Klarna Begins Rehiring After AI-First Strategy Misfires,” October 2025) and Financial Times coverage of Klarna’s September 2025 IPO.
    8.McKinsey & Company. The State of AI in 2025. November 2025; Gartner, “Worldwide AI Spending Forecast,” September 17, 2025.
    9.Boston Consulting Group. AI Adoption in 2024: Where Enterprises Stand. December 2024.
    10.Sutton, R.S., & Barto, A.G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction (2nd ed.). MIT Press; Friston, K. (2010). “The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?” Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11(2), 127–138.
    11.Public market data, February 3–10, 2026. Approximately $830B aggregate market capitalization decline across the enterprise software sector during the agent-coordination repricing event; cited by Howard Yu, IMD/Substack, February 2026.
    12.Haier Group. Annual Report 2024. World’s leading major appliance brand by retail volume for 17 consecutive years (Euromonitor International). The Rendanheyi micro-enterprise model is documented across Hamel & Zanini, Humanocracy (HBR Press, 2020).
    © 2026 Caerus Alpha, Inc. All rights reserved.
    Analysis based on public research sources; not investment advice.